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VIRTUAL LIMITATIONS OF THE 
FLESH: MERLEAU-PONTY AND 
THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF 
TECHNOLOGICAL DETERMINISM
abstract
The debate between instrumentalist and technological determinist positions on the nature of technology 
characterised the early history of the philosophy of technology. In recent years however technological 
determinism has ceased to be viewed as a credible philosophical position within the field. This paper uses 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology to reconsider the technological determinist outlook in phenomenological 
terms as an experiential response to the encounter with the phenomenon of modern technology. 
Recasting the instrumentalist-determinist debate in a phenomenological manner enables one to reconcile 
the apparent dualism of the instrumentalist and determinist positions through Merleau-Ponty’s ontology 
of the flesh. This ontology has recently been used to ground accounts of virtual embodiment. We 
argue that in addition to explaining away the classical form of technological determinism, it can also 
phenomenologically ground a novel understanding of technological determinism. Namely, a technological 
determinism of virtual embodiment.
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VIRTUAL LIMITATIONS OF THE FLESH
The formative years of the field of the philosophy of technology are often characterised as 
a debate over the nature of technology between the opposing positions of instrumentalism 
and technological determinism. Broadly construed, technological determinism is the 
position that technology determines society. By this it is meant that firstly, technology 
is the prime determinant of the course of social change. And secondly, that technology is 
autonomous in the sense that it has its own internal developmental logic such that, if left 
to its own devices, there is a certain path that technological development will necessarily 
take independent of human intention. In short, technological determinists hold that there is 
something in the nature of technology that is beyond the intentions of its creators and the 
control of its users. Instrumentalist positions, on the other hand, eschew the possibility that 
technology might have its own teleology and powers of social determination. Such positions 
emphasise the instrumental nature of technology, stressing its relative value-neutrality 
and the key role played by the user’s intentions in determining the ends towards which it 
is applied (Swer 2014).After the so-called empirical turn in the philosophy of technology, 
the field has been dominated by positions drawn from pragmatism, social constructivism 
and post-phenomenology (Brey, 2010). Modern forms of instrumentalist philosophy are 
in the ascendant, and determinism is no longer viewed as credible philosophical position 
(Du Toit & Swer, 2020; Peters, 2017; Swer, forthcoming). The tendency by contemporary 
philosophy of technology to dismiss technological determinism out of hand as uninformed 
or obscurantist has meant that little effort has been made to consider whether there is 
anything in the determinist account of technology that might be of philosophical merit (Du 
Toit & Swer, 2020, pp. 234-235). We suggest that, when considered from a phenomenological 
perspective, technological determinism can be seen as articulating a certain technological 
experience. When viewed in this phenomenological sense one can explore the experience 
that technological determinism expresses without endorsing its allegedly pessimistic attitude 
towards technological development or its essentialising tendencies. To this end, this paper 
draws upon the later philosophy of Merleau-Ponty, in order to reconsider instrumentalism 
and technological determinism from a phenomenological perspective. It suggests that 
both positions can be explicated as experiential aspects of complementary modes of being 
with technology, with instrumentalism relating to an embodiment mode, and determinism 
relating to a hermeneutic mode. The merit of viewing these positions from a Merleau-Pontian 
perspective is that it allows one to draw out the phenomenological bases of both positions. 
In addition, we argue, such an analysis reconciles these supposedly antagonistic positions 
1. Introduction
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by demonstrating, through the example of digital technologies, that the hermeneutic mode 
is present in the embodiment mode, and vice versa. Instrumentalism and determinism 
then appear not as diametrically opposed theoretical positions, but as equally valid and 
complementary aspects of the phenomenological experience of human-technology relations. 
Having reinterpreted the classical technological determinist position as but one feature 
of broader technological experiential whole, we then suggest that another form of 
technological determinism can be developed from Merleau-Ponty’s ontology of the flesh. 
Recent research into the phenomenology of virtuality (Irwin, 2014; Bailey, 2016; Hoel & 
Carusi, 2018; Ward, 2018; Du Toit, 2020; Du Toit, 2021) has drawn upon Merleau-Pontian 
phenomenology to explore the possibility of virtual embodiment. Such accounts have 
typically stressed the expansive features of virtual embodiment. We argue that the same 
Merleau-Pontian concepts that ground such accounts of embodiment in the virtual, can 
also ground a novel account of technological determinism. This determinism avoids the 
essentialist tendencies of classical technological determinism by remaining within the 
non-dualistic phenomenological framework provided by flesh, whilst also indicating the 
ability of the virtual to limit and determine the possibilities of the virtually embodied. Such 
an understanding, we suggest, can act as a corrective to the tendency to emphasise the 
expansive and liberating experiential aspects of digital technologies by drawing attention 
to the ability of technologically-mediated experience to diminish or constrain existential 
capacities.
The virtual should not be understood as related to the illusory, false, immaterial, or 
imaginary – nor as standing in opposition to the real, as Baudrillard’s (1981) emphasis on 
the dichotomous relationship between reality and virtual reality suggests. As Pierre Levy 
notes, the virtual “is often meant to signify the absence of existence, whereas ‘reality’ 
implies a material embodiment, a tangible presence” (1998, p. 23). In contrast, following 
Levy, we view the virtual as “not a derealization (the transformation of a reality into a 
collection of possibles) but a change of identity, a displacement of the center of ontological 
gravity of the object considered” (Levy, 1998, p. 26). Thus, the virtual implies a detachment 
from the “here” and “now” (Levy, 1998, p. 27). In introducing the idea of embodiment we 
find a point of engagement, experiential in character, that serves to found the individual’s 
engagement with the virtual by means of the digital technology artefact. Virtual embodiment 
is therefore suggestive of the idea that to thoroughly conceptualize the virtual, one must 
look towards both Philosophy of Technology (in terms of the digital technology artefact) and 
Phenomenology (in terms of the body-subject). There is thus, in describing the virtual, both 
recourse to the specific (in terms of individual artefacts) and to the general (in terms of the 
experiential encounter thereof by the individual).
Early works in the philosophy of technology are frequently placed within instrumentalist or 
technological determinist schools of thought1. Instrumentalists contend that technology is 
best understood at the level of the individual artefact, which is purported to be value-neutral 
(value-considerations applying only to issues concerning application). Determinists typically 
reject the view of technology as a neutral instrument of human volition, arguing rather that 
technology determines the course of societal development (to some degree). 
1 Lewis Mumford, Jacques Ellul and Langdon Winner are typically taken to be the three key technological determinist 
thinkers (Swer, forthcoming), although Merritt Roe Smith includes Herbert Marcuse, Martin Heidegger, Rene Dubos, 
Paul Goodman, Murray Bookchin, Kurt Vonnegut, David F. Noble and David Dickson as fellow travellers (1994, p. 28).
2. Philosophy of 
Technology and 
Phenomenology
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The recent turn2 towards pragmatist and social constructivist modes of technological 
analysis has effectively enshrined the instrumentalist outlook as the default position for 
contemporary philosophy of technology. Technological determinism, on the other hand, was 
deemed pessimistic, totalising, or excessively substantive and is no longer viewed as a credible 
philosophical position. However, the rejection of technological determinism by mainstream 
philosophers of technology does not explain its former popularity or its hold upon the popular 
imagination. We argue that a Merleau-Pontian analysis of the phenomenological bases for both 
instrumentalist and determinist perspectives provides such an explanation, and can ground 
a phenomenological account of technological determinism as a form of inter-subjectivity, 
thereby broadening our understanding of the existential implications of the mediation of 
human experience by digital technologies.
Swer (2014), drawing on Ihde (1979), suggests that instrumentalism and technological 
determinism have phenomenological roots in forms of human-technology relations that 
can be described as either embodiment or hermeneutic relations. Embodiment relations 
describe the extension of the subject’s perceptual field and are characterised by transparency 
as the subject experiences the world through the technology (and not technology itself). 
With hermeneutic relations technology-use becomes opaque, i.e. technology becomes the 
terminal point of the subject’s experience (in contrast to extension of the subject’s perceptual 
field). Swer suggests that the instrumentalist position is rooted in the phenomenological and 
embodied experience of technology. This human-technology relation is typified by the use of 
individual technologies, such as a cane or hammer. In such technologically-mediated praxis 
the artefact ‘withdraws’ and the user experiences technology as an extension of their bodily 
intentionality. Swer links technological determinism to hermeneutic human-technology 
relations that typify human interfaces within larger-scale technological systems. Technology 
at this level appears not as a neutral carrier of human volition but as a limit to it, an external 
object that must be interpreted – here the conception of technology as opposing human 
intentions becomes meaningful. 
This analysis suggests that instrumentalism and determinism are grounded in equally valid, 
though opposing, experiences of technological praxis. In the next section we argue that Swer’s 
(2014) phenomenological characterisation of the instrumentalism-determinism dichotomy 
may be enriched through engagement with a Merleau-Pontian perspective. Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology, we argue, can circumvent the agonistic dichotomy present in Swer’s account 
by demonstrating that embodiment and hermeneutic relations are present in all forms of 
technological praxis.
The proto-theory3 of technology presented in Phenomenology of Perception focuses on five 
specific technological artefacts: a feathered hat, a car, a blind man’s stick, a typewriter, and an 
organ. The account of the blind man’s stick is descriptive of both a motor habit (as one learns 
to use the cane) and a perceptual habit:
Once the stick has become a familiar instrument, the world of feelable things recedes 
and now begins, not at the outer skin of the hand, but at the end of the stick. .. . the 
2 See Achterhuis (2001), Brey (2010), Van den Eede, et al (2017), and Du Toit & Swer (2020).
3 The account of technology given in Phenomenology of Perception does not constitute an encompassing argument on 
the nature of technology, as do the full-fledged theories of technology presented by philosophers of technology such 
as Mumford and Ellul. Rather, in the early work of Merleau-Ponty, the use of examples of technological artefacts 
(such as the blind man’s cane and a woman’s feathered hat) present an explication of his phenomenological reasoning 
concerning embodiment (Ihde and Selinger, 2004, p. 361–367).
3. Technology 





P&M_20_5993-015_interni.indd   23 12/08/21   15:14
24
JEAN DU TOIT, GREGORY MORGAN SWER
stick is no longer an object perceived by a blind man, but an instrument with which he 
perceives. It is a bodily auxiliary, an extension of the bodily synthesis (Merleau-Ponty, 
1962, pp. 175–176).
The blind man’s stick reveals an instrumentalist perspective that is propounded throughout 
Merleau-Ponty’s early technological thought, whereby a tool is incorporated into the body 
schema to become transparent while allowing for expanded perceptual and motor potentiality. 
This instrumentalist conceptualization of technology extends to Merleau-Ponty’s examples 
of the car and the organ, whereby the artefact described becomes in some sense useful in 
the extension of the body-subject. The feathered hat and typewriter, in turn, illustrate how 
technology relates to the extension of the body through embodied skills, and that skilful use 
of an artefact is needed to utilize said artefact as an instrument for human use with specific 
ends. Again, this embodied mode of being with technology accords with the instrumental view 
of technology – the latter being sketched against a technological determinism that is rooted in 
the hermeneutic mode.
This changes in Merleau-Ponty’s later work, with Carusi and Hoel noting that instruments, 
tools, and technologies seem to become a constant preoccupation of Merleau-Ponty’s later 
thought, particularly in The Visible and the Invisible and his unfinished manuscripts and lecture 
notes (2015: 73). The instrumentalist perspective shifted as Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology 
matured, and we argue that his later concept of the flesh suggests a means to overcome 
the instrumentalist and determinist dichotomy regarding technology-relations. The flesh 
is an ontological concept that aims to overcome dualisms through the reconceptualization 
of such ‘dualisms’ as intertwining, chiasmically associated, and interdependent. Examples 
include world and consciousness, sensing and sensible, or technological artefact and the body 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1968, p. 123). The flesh suggests a reaching across of the world to the body-
subject, and the body-subject to the world, via a ‘space’ of connection – a co-implicity.4 
It is argued that, in accounting for the co-implicity that always resides in the body-subject and 
in the world simultaneously, Merleau-Ponty may ground a new account of technologically-
mediated experience. Such a novel account of technology, which will be illustrated through 
the example of digital technologies, suggests that ontologically the hermeneutic mode of 
technology relations is also present in the embodied mode, and that the embodiment mode 
is present in the hermeneutic mode. The later Merleau-Pontian account of technologically-
mediated experience dissolves the dichotomy between technological instrumentalism and 
technological determinism that typified classic philosophy of technology. Furthermore, 
this account unifies both positions by arguing that the flesh explains our engagement with 
technological artefacts (objects in the world) as a mutual constituted experiential field.
Understanding the co-implicity of body-subject and world by means of the flesh is also 
crucial for understanding the equating of tools and symbols in later Merleau-Ponty (in Eye 
and Mind). Merleau-Ponty describes both tools and symbols as technical objects, stating that: 
“Like all other technical objects, such as tools and signs, the mirror has sprung up along the 
open circuit between the seeing and the visible body. Every technique is a ‘technique of the 
body,’ illustrating and amplifying the metaphysical structure of our flesh” (1964, p. 6). Both 
tools and symbols are means by which experience of the world occurs, with a comparable 
4 Co-implicity is thus suggestive of the sensorium commune described in Phenomenology of Perception as the space of 
the intertwining of the senses “sometimes affected from one side, sometimes from the other” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 
p. 244). Whereas Merleau-Ponty’s initial account of embodied perception is characterized by a movement towards 
incarnated meaning, his later work moves beyond sensory perception to extend into and to be constitutive of 
intellectual life (De Saint Aubert, 2008, p. 10, 14).
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capacity to decentre the perceiving body (Hoel & Carusi, 2018). On the basis of this mutuality, 
Merleau-Ponty’s flesh grounds a new account of technologically-mediated experience that, 
ontologically, consolidates and unifies the hermeneutic and embodied modes of technology 
relations in the body-subject through a mutually constituting experiential field.
While the flesh offers considerable resources for a more nuanced understanding of 
technologically-mediated experience, recent analyses of digital technologies that utilize 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology tend to focus on the seemingly utopian capacity of the virtual 
to generate expanded horizons and potentialities for action and experience – often disregarding 
the possibility of technological mediation as experiential restriction.5 These analyses take up 
early Merleau-Pontian instrumentalism (artefacts as value-neutral tools), while disregarding 
the possibilities presented by the flesh for hermeneutic modes of being with technology. 
Instrumentalist accounts sketch the use of the technological artefact as tool, but disregard the 
deterministic influence of the technological artefact itself. However, as the flesh shows, there is 
a hermeneutic mode of being with technology that should be emphasized – again, a crossing, a 
chiasma, an intertwining of sense and world. The flesh represents for Merleau-Ponty the genesis 
of sensibility, for “he who sees cannot possess the visible unless he is possessed by it, unless he is 
of it …” (1968, pp. 134-135): just as there is encroachment between the two poles of the ‘dualisms’ 
that Merleau-Ponty identifies, so the world encroaches upon us and alters us – still, while we are 
of the world, we are paradoxically not the world (1968, p. 127).6 
The mode in which technology mediates the body both expands and constrains the body-
subject through the intertwining of body and the technological artefact. Thus, while one 
encounters the digital technology artefact through a bodily sensitivity and sensibility, through 
a sensory receptivity and a spontaneity, it should also be considered that the technological 
artefact can constrain and delimit the ways in which these aspects of the body schema 
may find expression in the virtual. In this paper we highlight how the hermeneutic mode, 
considered in relation to the virtual, reveals the manner whereby technological artefacts 
may exert a deterministic influence of concurrent expansion and constraint on the body-
subject – particularly through its influence on individual behaviour.
Merleau-Ponty rejects purely mechanical, physiological, behaviouristic, and reflex-arc 
explanations of behaviour as restrictive and reductionist from The Structure of Behaviour 
onwards (Corriveau, 1972, p. 19). Behaviour is not, for Merleau-Ponty, merely the sum of its 
parts but relates to a certain milieu characteristic of the human being, a specific ‘being-in-
the-world’ that is situational (Merleau-Ponty, 1963, p. 127). Both Phenomenology of Perception 
and The Visible and the Invisible expand on the intertwined relation between body-subject and 
world to suggest that behaviour relates to sensibility – a giving sense and a making sense of 
the world that precedes thought, representation, and formal symbolic activity and which takes 
place through intentionality to allow the body-subject to achieve a maximal perceptual grip 
on the world (Corriveau, 1972, pp. 22-23).7 
5 See Irwin, 2014; Bailey, 2016; Hoel & Carusi, 2018; Ward, 2018; Du Toit, 2020; Du Toit, 2021. Other descriptions of 
the virtual, such as Pierre Levy’s, are similarly suggestive of such expanded horizons for action and experience. Levy 
suggests that the virtual “is a fecund and powerful mode of being that expands the process of creation, opens up the 
future, injects a core of meaning beneath the platitude of immediate physical presence” (1998, p. 16). 
6 The idea that the world is not merely an object “does not mean that there was a fusion or coinciding of me with it: 
on the contrary, this occurs because a sort of dehiscence opens my body in two, and because between my body looked 
at and my body looking, my body touched and my body touching, there is overlapping or encroachment, so that we 
may say that the things pass into us, as well as we into the things” (Merleau-Ponty, 1968, p. 123). 
7 Behaviour thus transcends the merely physiological aspects of the body, while remaining bound within the 
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Merleau-Ponty’s description of behaviour (particularly as habitually learnt) links to Skinner’s 
concept of operant conditioning, but we carefully note that there exists a fundamental 
incompatibility in terms of these two thinkers. However, both views find agreement in 
that they are based in the relational character of behaviour that does not presuppose strict 
linearity (Pompermaier, 2018). Learning, for Merleau-Ponty, occurs through the process of 
trying to achieve maximal grip on the world through intentional actions in embodied and 
socially contextualized situations (Jing & Ejgil, 2017). Learning as a being-in-the-world relates 
to sense-making of the structures of the world – it is the process of increasing grip (sensibility) 
on the world, whether in actuality or in appearance.
The idea of achieving apparent maximal grip on the world is important for analysing 
engagement with the virtual because the process of achieving maximal grip in the virtual 
differs from that used to achieve maximal grip within the spatiality of the material world. 
Rather, the structuring of digital technologies in line with rewards (through captological 
programming and Pavlovian mechanisms, for instance) convinces the individual of having 
achieved maximal grip on the virtual – certain ways of behaving in the virtual lead to a sense 
of reward, which in turn suggests that one has made sense of the virtual (achieved maximal 
grip). An example of such a technological positing of having achieved maximal grip is the 
captological technique of designing software applications in such a way as to continually 
notify users of content (such as recurrent Facebook notifications). These notifications might 
be a reminder of a birthday, an indication of someone having liked one’s post, updates on 
public forums, or a direct message from a friend. The variance in meaning of each of these 
notifications allows the device to take on the characteristics of a slot-machine – one is never 
sure of what one is being notified, whether the notification is indicative of a public message 
on a topic one is interested in (small win), or a direct message from a friend (jackpot). In either 
case, once a specific behaviour has been enacted (the phone unlocked, the app opened) the 
potentiality of a notification is replaced with a certainty.
While the concept of flesh illuminates the hermeneutic mode of human-technology relations 
and resolves ontologically the determinism/instrumentalism dualism, the concordant 
embodied account of behaviour being reinforced through the mechanistic and predictable 
functioning of the digital technology artefact underlines the technologically deterministic 
capacity of the virtual to structure human behaviour – both fields of action and modes of 
perception are deterministically transformed and distorted. In the next section we expand 
our discussion of individual experience of the virtual towards a description of the social 
conditioning wrought by the virtual on a larger scale to show how values, systems of 
rationality, and thought are conditioned and limited in concrete ways.
In the philosophy of technology, analysis of the value-ladenness of technology tends to 
focus on the role that values play in technology design, or the ways that the operation of 
a technology enforces or restricts certain forms of behaviour. The classic example of an 
inherently political technology is the Moses bridge where a particular technological design 
was chosen to restrict access to the beaches by certain racial/socioeconomic groups (Winner, 
1986, p. 21).8 Analyses of virtual technologies rarely explore such ‘deterministic’ issues and 
8 Winner describes how the low-hanging overpasses in Long Island were designed by architect Robert Moses to 
realize a specific social function. The specifications of these low-hanging overpasses deliberately prevented passenger 
buses (which typically served African-Americans and low income individuals) from passing underneath, while 
expensive automobiles (such as those owned by the wealthy) could traverse the roads with ease. Evidence from the 
period suggests that these bridges gave manifestation to Moses’s racial bias and social-class discrimination (Winner, 
1986, pp. 123-124).
5. The Uniformity 
of the Virtual 
Bodily Schema
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tend instead to explore virtuality’s expansion of experiential possibilities.9 One reason for 
this neglect might be the apparent immateriality of the virtual. Instances of constraining 
technologies like the Moses bridge are decidedly material, in the sense of being tangible, and 
operate deterministically in an equally tangible way, by physically preventing the passage of 
certain types of vehicle along the bridge. The ostensible immateriality of the virtual appears 
to render it ontologically different from older technological forms and thereby immune to 
deterministic analyses that seem rooted in the concrete. 
Merleau-Ponty’s later phenomenology serves as a corrective to such dualistic treatments of 
the technological through the application of his ontology of the flesh, a matrix of intertwined 
and reciprocal relations that serves as the foundation of the body’s relational engagement 
with its environs, to the virtual. A Merleau-Pontian analysis of virtual technologies grounds 
our experience of the virtual world in the body and connective lattice of the flesh. It unifies 
the virtual and the material, for the experience of the virtual arises in the space between 
the embodied subject and digital technology. The virtual and the ‘real’ are the same in that 
they are both experienced by an embodied subject who perceives and navigates within them 
through the employment of bodily frames of reference. Consequently, questions concerning 
technology’s ability to constrain or limit asked of older, material technologies can also be 
asked of ‘immaterial’ virtual technologies. The individual’s experience of technology is as 
embodied in the ‘real’ world as it is in the virtual. If the virtual is to be described as concrete in 
this embodied manner, then the virtual is as concrete as the material (i.e. no dichotomy exists) 
and the concepts utilized in philosophy of technology (such as technological determinism) are 
equally applicable. 
Phenomenological analyses of digital technologies that employ Merleau-Ponty’s work (e.g. 
Irwin, 2014; Bailey, 2016; Hoel & Carusi, 2018; Ward, 2018; Du Toit, 2020; Du Toit, 2021) tend 
to focus on the ways in which the virtual extends perceptual capacities. However, we argue 
that in order to remain true to Merleau-Ponty’s principle of reversibility one is committed to 
considering the technologically-mediated experience of the virtual world both ways. Not just 
with regards to the experiences of the embodied subject ‘touching’ the virtual, but also with 
regards to the ways in which the virtual ‘touches’ the embodied subject. In considering the 
virtual as enmeshed in the flesh, we recognise an interfusing of specific properties that relate 
to one’s embodied encounter with the world and the virtual. 
The virtual world, understood as a ‘concrete’ space, is one that is layered with values. The 
subject embodied in the virtual finds their range of possibilities thoroughly circumscribed, 
sometimes by physical limitations of the technology and sometimes by constraints designed 
by those who create and maintain the technology. Online behaviour is as norm-governed as 
offline behaviour.10 And for all that the virtual can radically augment human perceptual and 
expressive capacities, the procedures for such augmentation are rule-governed. Navigating the 
virtual requires an implicit grasp of technological rationality. The virtual is “a distributed system 
where bodies, symbolic systems, technologies and environments are intertwined and in which 
phenomena are articulated in characteristic ways, according to particular styles” (Hoel & Carusi, 
2018, p. 62). And praxis in the virtual world is as formative of patterns of thought and behaviour 
as praxis in the material world. The analysis of measurement and the body can flesh out an 
account of the deterministic effects of the virtual on the embodied subject. 
Paul Virilio sketches the phenomenological dimensions of the transferal of standards of 
measurement from the virtual to the material world. Analysing the shift in spatial and 
9 Cf. Pierre Levy, Becoming Virtual (1998). 
10 Floridi (2015, p. 264) argues that in the post-digital era no separation exists between the two dimensions.
P&M_20_5993-015_interni.indd   27 12/08/21   15:14
28
JEAN DU TOIT, GREGORY MORGAN SWER
temporal experience that occurred with the rise of what he terms “computer-assisted 
representation”, Virilio stresses the role of measurement in founding our ability to experience 
the world (1991, p. 51). Being embodied in the virtual, Virilio suggests, means acquiring a 
system of orientation radically different from that of material spatio-temporality, one that 
obliterates distance and positionality. He further argues that the spatio-temporal orientation 
acquired in the virtual is then transported into the non-virtual, facilitated and reinforced by 
the increasing incorporation of virtual technologies into work and leisure activities. 
On Virilio’s account the virtual and non-virtual form a continuum with no clear boundary. 
As more forms of praxis are mediated by virtual technologies, the application to the material 
world of norms and orientations derived from the experience of virtual embodiment 
proliferates. And the result is a “delirium of interpretation due to the excess of mediation 
of experiences”, a state in which it becomes increasingly common to experience social 
reality within the interpretative framework of the virtual (Virilio, 1991, p. 48). Thus, praxis 
becomes increasingly technologically-mediated even when it does not directly involve the 
use of technology.11 Returning to Merleau-Ponty, we further suggest that alterations in the 
experiential framework by which we measure and engage the world, virtual and material, in 
turn produce alterations in the self-understanding and capacities of the embodied subject, 
which itself is the ground of all measurement.
As Hoel and Carusi suggest, regarding Merleau-Ponty’s thought in The Visible and the Invisible 
(1968) and Nature (2003), the body is considered the “standard or measure of things” whereby 
“‘measurement’ [becomes] an ontological concept that concerns the inner scaffolding of 
the existential field, the ‘invisible armature’ of the perceived” (2018, p. 48). The body is 
intertwined and complicit in phenomena, which is of particular relevance to any analysis 
of the virtual that explores the expansion or constraint of body schemas via technological 
mediation.12 The measuring body emphasizes “the mediated nature of knowledge and being, 
by more radically integrating mediating artefacts into the perceptual/conceptual complex” 
(Hoel & Carusi, 2018, p. 49). Hereby a relative autonomy is intuited with regards to symbols 
and tools, which through their operation “serve to decentre and displace the interrogating 
capacities of the perceiving body in productive ways” through the expansive dynamic of the 
flesh (Hoel & Carusi, 2018, p. 49).
The body as measurement (i.e. the perceiving body reconfigured into a symbolically and 
technologically disturbed and mediated measuring body) highlights how both symbols and 
tools serve as ‘measures of being’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1973, p. 124). Merleau-Ponty argues “my 
body is not only one perceived among others, it is the measurant (mesurant) of all, Nullpunkt of 
all the dimensions of the world” (1968, pp. 248–9). It is against this concept of the measuring 
body that the relation of the body-subject to the world makes sense, and whereby behaviour 
becomes understandable as meaningful in a larger unified whole (rather than as momentary 
and fleeting). Movement and behaviour, through the world and through the virtual, are 
elucidated through the flesh wherewith the measuring body is known – and due to the 
delimiting and structuring effects of the virtual, behaviour is structured according to the 
confines of the digital technology artefact’s functioning. 
In this regard it is sensible to, in a manner of speaking, turn Hoel and Carusi’s postulation of 
the measuring body around to trace not the influence of the body-subject on the world, but 
11 Cf. Mark B.N. Hansen, particularly Bodies in code (2012) and Feed-forward (2015).
12 Hoel and Carusi describe the measuring body as a “new conceptual tool” that “neither privileges nor coincides 
with sensory perception. It acknowledges that technoscientific interrogations of the world involve distributed and 
displaced agencies of observation that engage in a two-way formative exchange between observer and observed” 
(2018, pp. 47-48).
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rather to trace the measuring effect of the technological artefact. The technological artefact, 
in delimiting and funnelling being, functions in a technologically deterministic manner. 
In other words, the measuring artefact, rather than merely broadening the body-subject’s 
horizons of engagement by means of the virtual, generates a uniformity of body schemas by 
structuring experience and behaviour along predictable and linear lines of influence – the 
digital technology artefact functions in a manner similar to technological artefacts in a broad 
sense (as suggested by technological determinism). This means that engagement with the 
virtual happens in a consistent manner because the specific digital artefact can only ever 
function in a similar manner regardless of the wide variety of individuals across a society, 
or between societies, that make use of it – thus, such devices structure human perception 
and behaviour in an expected and predictable manner. Often, the structuring effects of the 
measuring artefact entail capitalistic, advertising and consumerist agendas – and it is these 
criteria that are emphasized, rather than the expansive and creative potentialities inherent in 
said technology.
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology makes allowance for a plurality of lived world(s) and 
suggests that these worlds are not monadic (1968, p. 48, 62, 84, 269; 2002, p. 210, 214). The body 
of the body-subject is where sense is made of space and things, but the body is also already 
interrelated to other body schemas by means of the flesh as an interworld. The flesh of the 
virtual, the point at which the body-subject and the digital technology artefact intermesh, 
makes this interworld concretized and linked; lived bodies are unfurled unto each other by 
means of the structure of technological mediation (which allows expansion of the body, while 
also curtailing and delimiting this unfurling along capitalistic lines). From the individual’s 
behaviour one may therefore explicate a collective element to behaviour across society – for 
“as soon as something is taken as expressive there is a carnal communicability to it, and with 
that an ‘opening to generality’” (Hoel & Carusi, 2018, p. 56). Technological systems are thus 
“standards or measures of being, which have the capacity to transform the metaphysical 
structure of the interrogating apparatus and hence to displace the horizons of the perceptible/
intelligible world” (Hoel & Carusi, 2018, p. 62). The virtual, in concretizing intersubjective 
relations, serves to structure and delimit (whilst expanding and opening up) human 
perception and behaviour according to the strict criteria of the ‘measuring artefact’. 
Furthermore, the rethinking of the virtual presented here allows one to explicate the 
formative and transformative capabilities of technological tools, symbols, and cultural forms 
of expression by means of the virtual (at the individual and broader cultural level). Bodily 
schemas that are contorted by the virtual are linked to wider intellectual/cultural patterns 
to such an extent that the technological flattening of schemas is likely to have an impact at 
a cultural level too: Shared symbols in the virtual lead to a uniformity of bodily schemas and 
suppresses (but never extinguishes) the body’s capacity to displace established horizons of 
meaning.
An opening up of Merleau-Ponty’s early instrumentalist account of technology to the broader 
experience of technological praxis by means of the flesh reveals that both embodied and 
hermeneutic relations are concurrently found in the individual’s encounter with technological 
artefacts. Such a recognition allows one to phenomenologically validate the experiential 
insight into different aspects of human-machine relations that underlies both instrumentalist 
and technological determinist positions, whilst resolving their apparent antagonism by 
showing both positions to be correct but partial descriptions of technologically-mediated 
experience. 
We also argued that a Merleau-Pontian account of virtual embodiment opens up the 
possibility of developing a novel form of technological determinism. This new determinism, 
6. Conclusion
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like the classic form of technological determinism, is grounded in the bodily experience of 
the technologically-mediated subject. It, however, does not reinforce the instrumentalist-
determinist dichotomy that Merleau-Ponty’s ontology of the flesh was used to dissolve, but 
rather uses this ontology as the foundation of its account which focuses on the relations 
between the Merleau-Pontian body-subject and digital technology. The elucidation of such a 
technological determinism reveals a capacity of certain technologies to constrain or restrict 
the experiential and behavioural potentialities found in the technologically-mediated 
existential field. To this end we have reconsidered the relation of the body-subject and the 
virtual, illustrating the ways in which digital technology artefacts may at once open up new 
horizons of experience while also concretely determining values, systems of rationality, and 
thought.
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